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BACKGROUND

The National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) wants to be in the
business of esports.1 On August 25, 2017, the NCAA issued a request for
proposals (RFP) that solicited assistance in evaluating a possible role for
esports within the organization for presentation to the NCAA's board of

Dr. Thomas A. Baker III (tab3@uga.edu) is a tenured Associate Professor of Sport Law
at the International Center for Sport Management (ICSM), University of Georgia. He is also the
Editor-in-Chief for the JournalofLegalAspects ofSport. Dr. Baker has more than fifty scholarly
publications and has written extensively on the influence of law on student-athlete regulations.
He would like to thank Mark Deppe and Michael Brooks for allowing him to interview them for
this article, as well as their substantial contributions to collegiate esports.
**
John T. Holden is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Management at the
Spears School of Business at Oklahoma State University.
1.
See Kieran Darcy, College Esports is the Next Big Thing in Varsity
Athletics, ESPN (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/21113602/thenext-big-thing-collegiate-athletics-esports; see also Chris Radford, Intersport to Help NCAA
Research Esports, NCAA (Nov. 30, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/
resources/media-center/news/intersport-help-ncaa-research-esports (discussing the NCAA's
contract with a marketing and consulting firm, Intersport, to take the next step towards
involvement in esports).
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governors. 2 At first blush, news of the NCAA's interest in developing a
college segment of esports (collegiate esports) may seem like good news for
esports enthusiasts, players, and other key stakeholders within esports. After
all, the NCAA is the mechanism that regulates the multi-billion-dollar
business of big-time intercollegiate athletics in the United States. (The
NCAA's move into the emerging phenomenon of collegiate esports would be
a rising tide that lifts all boats well, almost all boats; collegiate esports
players themselves would likely end up on a sinking ship.) In the RFP, the
NCAA made clear that any movement into collegiate esports would be done
in a way that aligns with its organizational values. 3 The problem for esports
players is that the NCAA's "values" include an amateurism model for
intercollegiate athletics 4 that has been described as the "shame of college
sports"5 based on how unfairly athletes are treated under the model.

For example, consider the case of Donald De La Haye, a former varsity
football player for the University of Central Florida (UCF). De La Haye is a
former football player because he lost his scholarship after being declared
ineligible by UCF based on the school's interpretation of an NCAA
amateurism policy 6 that restricts the use of athlete names, images, and
likenesses (NILs) for commercial purposes. 7 De La Haye had the dream of
being a videographer. In pursuit of that dream, he created a YouTube channel
that he called Deestroying-a channel that now has more than 117,000
followers and generates small sums of money for De La Haye.I De La Haye
responded to UCF's decision to terminate his scholarship with a broadcast on
his channel that he aptly titled, "I Lost My Full D1 Scholarship Because of
My YouTube Channel." 9 In his video response, De La Haye took issue with

2.
Ben Fischer, Reaching Out: NCAA Issues RFPfor Help Evaluating Possible Role in
Esports, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. DAILY (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.sports
businessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/2017/08/31,/Colleges/Esports.aspx.
3.
Id.
4.
See NCAA Core Values, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ncaa-core-values (last
visited Aug. 20, 2018).
5. Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 2011),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-shame-of-college-sports/308643/.
6. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 2017-2018 NCAA DIVISIoN I MANUAL,
Bylaw 12.1, at 63 (2017) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL], http://www.ncaapublications.com/
productdownloads/Dll 8.pdf.
7.
Dan Gartland, UCF Kicker Ruled Ineligible After YouTube Channel Gets Him in
Trouble with NCAA, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 31, 2017), https://www.si.com/collegefootball/2017/07/31/ucf-kicker-donald-de-la-haye-ineligible-ncaa-youtube-videos.
8. Id.
9.
Donald De La Haye, aka Deestroying, I Lost My Full DI ScholarshipBecause ofMy
YouTube Channel, YOUTUBE (July 31, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fh69X6X55w.
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demands that he demonetize his videos in order to retain his scholarship to
play football at UCF. o In an interview with Forbes, De La Haye later added
that he thinks it's "idiotic, stupid, [and] preposterous" that the NCAA permits
his coach to make $2 million off of his name while De La Haye is unable to
make "a couple thousand bucks" off of his YouTube channel."
Yet, if De La Haye had played varsity esports, rather than NCAAregulated football, he would have been able to keep his channel and his
scholarship. In fact, it's common for esports players to have their own
YouTube or Twitch channels,' 2 and there are no prohibitions in collegiate
esports against the monetization of student-athlete NILs.13 Furthermore,
former professional esports players who have profited off of esports in the
past are permitted to leave the professional ranks and pursue an education by
accepting scholarships to play varsity esports.1 4 Former professional athletes
are unable to do the same for NCAA-sanctioned sports.' 5 This means that
these athletes must choose to either pursue professional careers in sport or
fund their education by playing intercollegiate athletics. Those examples
represent just two of many instances in which student-athletes on varsity
esports teams currently enjoy greater choice and financial freedom in
comparison to other student-athletes on NCAA-sanctioned teams. Rather than
absorbing college esports into its amateurism model for intercollegiate
athletics, we suggest that the NCAA should instead adapt to be more like
collegiate esports. For this to happen, the NCAA would need to abandon-or
at least relax its adherence to the "revered tradition"1 6 of amateurism, a
concept that conceals the NCAA's anticompetitive cost control mechanisms
under a cloud of sport ideology.' 7
It is doubtful that the NCAA, a profit-maximizing collection of non-profit
institutions, would want to voluntarily discard a concept that justifies the
suppression of labor costs and restricts the liberty of athletes to the benefit of

10. Id.
11. Darren Heitner, NCAA Fails Kicker Donald De La Haye and All Student-Athletes,
FORBES
(Aug.
3,
2017,
7:44 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/
2017/08/03/ncaa-fails-kicker-donald-de-la-haye-and-all-student-athletes/#569966f33776.
12. Darcy, supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., Based on a study of fifty varsity members of NACE conducted by the author
(on file with author).
14. Amy Diluna, College Scholarshipsfor Video Games? It's Happening, NBC NEWS
(June 20, 2017, 8:18 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/feature/college-game-plan/collegescholarships-videos-games-it-s-happening-n773996.
15. See NCAA MANUAL, supranote 6, Bylaw 12.2.3, at 69 (stating that individuals shall
not be eligible for intercollegiate athletics if the individual ever competed on a professional
team).
16. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 119 (1984).
17. See INCOLN ALLISON, AMATEURISM IN SPORT 8 (JA. Mangan ed., 2001).
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its members. To the contrary, the NCAA has invested substantially in
defending amateurism against legal challenges brought by the same athletes
the NCAA purports to protect from commercial exploitation.'" Thus far,
courts have acquiesced to the NCAA's self-defined version of amateurism
based on the dubious position that doing so is necessary to the preservation of
consumer interest in the NCAA's products. 19 Nevertheless, college athletes
continue to challenge the NCAA's amateurism model in court, and in fact,
there are multiple actions pending against the NCAA that threaten the legality
of amateurism.20

Some esports stakeholders within college esports have taken notice of the
legal problems associated with the NCAA's amateurism model and have
worked to keep the more controversial constraints-imposed on athletes by
that model-out of college esports. For instance, the National Association of
College Esports (NACE), 21 the current governing body for college esports,
has intentionally left amateurism out of its league rules and regulations: "The
majority of varsity programs have been built intentionally to stay separate" of
the NCAA's bylaws, said NACE Director Michael Brooks. 22 Brooks added
that barring some "pretty dramatic exceptions" for college esports, the NCAA
would not succeed in absorbing esports "under its banner." 23
Whether or not the NCAA attempts and succeeds in absorbing collegiate
esports "under its banner" does not change the fact that the future shape and
structure of college esports remains uncertain. College esports is in its

18. NCAA Bylaw 2.9 states that its purpose in preserving amateurism is to protect
student-athletes from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises. NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 6, Bylaw 2.9, at 4.
19. Thomas A. Baker III & Natasha T. Brison, From Board of Regents to O'Bannon:
How Antitrust and Media Rights Have Influenced College Football, 26 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV.

331, 346 (2016).
20. For example, In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation (4:14-cv02758-CW) is a consolidation that involves two antitrust challenges to the NCAA's cap on
athlete compensation and both actions are pending in the Northern District of California. 3 11
F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2014). The lead plaintiff in one of the actions is Martin Jenkins, and he
is represented by Jeffrey Kessler, one of the leading antitrust and sport law attorneys in the
United States. Id.
21. NACE is the governing body for more than thirty varsity esports programs. See Sean
Morrison, NACE Announces Partnership with NJCAA, ESPN (Mar. 13, 2018),
http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/22741129/national-junior-college-athletic-associationpartners-national-association-collegiate-esports.
22. NCAA to Evaluate Esports Landscape in October, ESPN (Aug. 15, 2017),
http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/20341540/ncaa-discuss-esports-landscapeoctober.
23. Id.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol70/iss1/4

4

Baker and Holden: College Esports: A Model for NCAA Reform
COLLEGE ESPORTS

2018]

59

infancy 24 in terms of development, with more than half of the current varsity
programs having formed within the past two years.25 From a list of more than
fifty esports programs that currently provide scholarships to varsity esports
players, twenty-seven are housed within NCAA member institutions. 26 Those
schools will have a say in the development of college esports regulation. 27
Thus, the possibility exists that the NCAA could influence the future direction
of college esports regulation without ever formally taking over the reins of
regulatory control.
Uncertainty over the future of college esports fuels the need for research
that can help interested parties develop appropriate college esports
governance models tailored to meet any unique demands inherent to college
esports. Unfortunately, a review of the relevant literature on college esports
reveals a dearth of legal research on collegiate esports. 28 Furthermore, no
extant study has examined the current state of collegiate esports regulation,
much less the role that amateurism should play in shaping this emerging
electronic sport enterprise. The research presented in this Article contributes
significantly to the body of knowledge on esports by being the first to address
current and future regulation within collegiate esports. The findings in this
Article also add to the existing literature on esports by providing new insights
into the regulation of intercollegiate athletics and the need for reform within
the NCAA. Specifically, the findings of this Article reveal how the success of
collegiate esports could provide a model for reform for the NCAA.

24. See Robert B. Norris Jr., It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Gets Hurt: Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Ass'n and the Problem ofInteractivity, 13 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 81, 81
(2011), http://ncjolt.org/its-all-fim-and-games-until-someone-gets-hurt-brown-v-entertainmentmerchants-assoc-and-the-problem-of-interactivity/. Indeed, esports themselves are in a very
nascent stage in comparison to other sports, but esports or organized video-gaming competitions
have existed in some form since at least the 1980s. John T. Holden & Sam C. Ehrlich, Esports,

Skins Betting and Wire Fraud Vulnerability, 21 GAMING L. REV. 566, 566 (2017).
25. For information on program expansion and college esports, see Michael Smith,
Colleges Flip the Switch on Esports, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS Bus. J. (Apr. 24, 2017),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2017/04/24/Colleges/esports.aspx.
26. A ComprehensiveList ofE-Sports Scholarships, SPORTS MGMT. DEGREE HUB (Apr.
3,
2018),
https://www.sportsmanagementdegreehub.com/comprehensive-list-e-sportsscholarships/.

27.

See 2017 Q2 Collegiate ESports Report: 40 Schools Giving $4M+ in Scholarships,

THE NEXT LEVEL (May 31, 2017), https://medium.com/tnlmedia/2017-q2-collegiate-esportsreport-40-schools-4m-in-scholarships-6c le0 17c49e0.
28. An exhaustive review of the literature on LexisNexis revealed that, at the time of
writing, there existed only nineteen law journal and law review publications on esports, four of
which were comments, and none of which focused on collegiate esports specifically.
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II. WHAT ARE ESPORTS (AND COLLEGIATE ESPORTS)?

Esports is an umbrella term that applies to various types of competitive
video game tournaments involving popular strategy and battle video games.

29

'

Professional esports takes the form of a multitude of competitive video game
tournaments providing financial awards to winners and other qualifiers. 3 0 The
term "collegiate esports" applies to competitive video game tournaments that
almost always require that players must be full-time college students. 3
Instead of handing out cash prizes to players, collegiate esports tournaments
typically provide players with scholarships or prize awards for covering a
32
players' education costs.

Central to both collegiate and professional esports is the fact that the
"sports" used in competitive esports tournaments are commercial game titles,
meaning that game producers actually own the "sports" and can restrict them
to the limits provided by intellectual property law.33 In fact, professional
esports players, collegiate esports players, and video game lovers alike must
all agree to the terms and conditions for use imposed on them by the video
game producer. 34 For gamers, the terms and conditions set by game producers
have little to no influence on their consumption of the game title. 35 Ownership
of the "sports" that make up esports becomes important, however, when the
game titles are used by third parties in the operation of esports tournaments or
in live streaming of gameplay and even with non-tournament gameplay on

29. Rafi Letzter, Everything You Need to Know About the World ofProfessionalGaming,
Which is on Track to be Biggerthan FootballOne Day, Bus. INSIDER (Aug. 5, 2015, 12:48 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-are-esports-2015-8.
The term esports is generally
perceived to incorporate a combination of some type of organized competitive video-gaming
centered around a prize or an award. See generally Juho Hamari & Max Sjablom, What is

eSports and Why Do People Watch It?, 27 INTERNET RES. 211 (2017).
30. See Letzter, supra note 29.
31. Telephone Interview with Mark Deppe, Esports Program Dir., Univ. of Cal. Irvine
(June 6, 2017) [hereinafter Deppe Interview].

32.

Id.

33.

See Dan L. Burk, Owning e-Sports: ProprietaryRights in Professional Computer

Gaming, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1535, 1536-37 (2013). But see Jennifer E. Rothman, Response, ESports as a Prism for the Role ofEvolving Technology in IntellectualProperty, 161 U. PA. L.
REV.
317,
323
(2013),
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1111 &context=penn lawreviewonline (providing a contrasting view on the limits of
intellectual property rights in regard to esports).
34. For an example of a game's terms of use, see Terms of Use, LEAGUE OF LEGENDS,
http://na.leagueoflegends.com/en/legal/termsofuse (last modified Dec. 6, 2017).
35. See Burk, supra note 33, at 1544-45; Dan L. Burk, Authorization and Governance in
Virtual Worlds, 15 FIRST MONDAY (May 3, 2010), http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/
article/view/2967/2527 ("[C]onsumers typically neither read the fine print, nor when they do
read the fine print, do they understand the terms stated.").
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webcasts.3 6 For instance, at EVO 2013, the world's largest fighting-based
game tournament, video-game producing giant Nintendo tried to have its
product, Super Smash Bros. Melee, pulled from the event and broadcasts of
the event. 37 Nintendo eventually backed down after a public outcry from its
consumers and allowed its popular game title to be used for competition
play. 38
Nintendo's initial resistance to involvement in esports is atypical within
the industry; in fact, game producers manage most of the popular professional
esports competitions. 39 Some even have a history of absorbing third-party
competitions that successfully make use of their game titles. 40 For example,
Blizzard Entertainment (Blizzard) partnered with the Texas eSports
Association (TESPA), a collegiate esports league, and works with the TESPA
founders who operate tournaments for Blizzard. 41
A.

ProprietaryRights and Live Streaming

As for live streaming of gameplay on webcasts, game producers have
been less interested in interfering with third-party broadcasts. Gainers and
tournament operators regularly broadcast live play of copyright-protected
video games on websites such as Twitch or YouTube, and game producers

36. See Michael Larkey, Cooperative Play: Anticipating the Problem of Copyright
Infringement in the New BusinessofLive Video Game Webcasts, 13 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
52, 54 (2015) (arguing that gameplay webcasts exploit the Copyright Owners' copyright without
their permission, increasing the likelihood of future litigation).
37. Will Partin, With the Switch, Nintendo is Finally Taking Esports Seriously, THE
META, https://killscreen.com/themeta/switch-nintendo-finally-taking-esports-seriously/
(last
visited Aug. 16, 2018).
38. Id.
39. For examples, see League of Legends World Championship, the annual professional
world championship that is hosted by Riot Games, the games producer; Battle.net World
Championship Series (BWCS), a series of tournaments that are operated by Blizzard
Entertainment for their games StarCraft II, World of Warcraft, and Hearthstone: Heroes of
Warcraft; and The International, an annual Dota 2 esports championship that is hosted by Valve
Corporation, the producer of Dota 2. See, e.g., Katherine E. Hollist, Time to be Grown-Ups
About Video Gaming: The Rising eSports Industry and the Need for Regulation, 57 ARIZ. L.
REv. 823, 827-29 (2015) (discussing developer-sponsored leagues such as Riot Games' League
of Legends and Valve's Dota 2).
40. For example, Blizzard Entertainment bought out the Texas eSports Association
(TESPA), a collegiate esports league, from its founders and then hired those who ran the
tournaments to continue operating them for Blizzard. See Tyler Rosen, Partnership Unlocked:
TeSPA and Blizzard Join Forces!, TESPA (Nov. 21, 2013), http://web.archive.org/web/
20131125014328/http://tespa.org:80/blog/2013/11/21,/partnership-unlocked-tespa-andblizzard-join-forces/.
41. Id.
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seemingly look the other way rather than engage in rigorous legal enforcement
of their property rights. For a few popular games (e.g., World of Warcraft,
Counter-Strike: Global-Offensive, and Minecraft), users have been granted
permission for live stream play in the terms of use agreements.42 One of the
most popular web stream providers is Twitch, which operates a "partnership"
program whereby its partners (live-streaming players) earn a share of the ad
revenue that their streams generate for Twitch.43 Players who stream on
Twitch can make between $2.00 and $5.00 per 1,000 impressions. 44 While
Twitch is a free service, viewers can pay a monthly fee, half of which is paid
to the streamer. 45 Most streamers earn very little through Twitch, but very
popular streamers are able to play full-time and support themselves off of the
shared revenue. 46 The average professional streamer makes between $2,000
and $5,000 per month, but high-profile streamers, such as Lirik, 47 attract more
than 900,000 followers, 6,000 subscribers, and earn more than $200,000 off
of the subscribers alone. 48 Once impressions are accounted for, the dollar
amounts paid to professional streamers can skyrocket. For instance, a
professional streamer named Pewdiepie makes roughly $12 million a year. 49
Another interesting aspect of the relationship between esports and Twitch
is the fact that viewers can watch Twitch broadcasts of esports tournaments
(including the most popular professional esports tournaments) without a
subscription.5 0 The tournaments do not charge Twitch for media rights to the
tournaments and viewers are not charged by Twitch to view them.5 1 Twitch is

42. Larkey, supra note 36, at 57-58.
43. William A. Hamilton et al., Streaming on Twitch: Fostering Participatory
Communities of Play Within Live Mixed Media, 2014 Proc. SIGCHI Conf. on Hum. Factors
Computing Sys. 1315, 1316.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Lirik (@LIRIK), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/Lirik/STATUS/604769669564780
544.
48. See Julia Glum, Meet 'Ninja', a 26-Year-Old Gamer Making Tons of Cash Playing
Fortnite, MONEY (Mar. 15, 2018) http://time.com/money/5201106/ninja-fortnite-moneystream-twitch/; Jesse Aaron, How Much Can you Make Streaming as a Professional Video
Gamer, HUFFPOST (Mar. 27, 2015, 9:05 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/jesseaaron/how-much-can-you-make-str_b_6926362.html.
49. Madeline Berg, YouTube's PewDiePieMade $12 Million This Year Despite Racist
Videos, FORBES (Dec. 7, 2017, 9:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/maddieberg/
2017/12/07/how-youtubes-pewdiepie-made- 12-million-this-year-despite-racistvideos/#37528d7564e9.
50. See Ben Popper, FieldofStreams: How Twitch Made Video Games a SpectatorSport,
THE VERGE (Sept. 30, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/30/4719766/twitchraises-20-million-esports-market-booming.
5 1. See id.
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currently considered the "ESPN of esports,"5 2 but as the popularity of esports
increases, the probability also increases that other media outlets will
eventually emerge and start charging viewers for access to esports content. It
is also very likely that esports tournaments will eventually mirror their
traditional sport counterparts (e.g., the National Football League (NFL) and
Major League Baseball (MLB)) by charging media partners for broadcast
rights. Riot Games, the producer of League of Legends (LoL), recently signed
a seven-year $350 million media rights deal with BAMTech a streaming
company that is part of MLB Advanced Media. 53 What all this means is that
the esports industry has yet to actualize the full financial potential from livestreaming tournaments.
B.

The Economic Appeal ofEsports

Professional esports currently provide the only basis for forecasting
collegiate esports' economic potential. Professional esports is projected to be
a billion-dollar industry by 2019 and a 1.5-billion-dollar industry by 2020.54
The most popular esports competition is the LoL World Championship. In
2016, the LoL finals attracted forty-three million total viewers with a peak
concurrent viewership of 14.7 million for the final match.5 5 For perspective,
consider that the 2017 National Basketball Association (NBA) Finals attracted
20.4 million total viewers and was the most-viewed NBA finals since 1998.56
Adding to esports' commercial appeal is the fact that esports enthusiasts have
purchasing power. A recent study revealed that forty-three percent of those
who watch esports competitions have an annual household income of $75,000
per year or more, with thirty-one percent reporting earnings of $90,000 or
more.5

7

52. See id.
53. Callum Leslie, Riot Signs $350 Million Deal with MLB Streaming Tech Division, DOT
ESPORTS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://dotesports.com/business/riot-signs-350-million-deal-withmlb-streaming-tech-divisionbut-wont-leave-twitc-4113.
54. See
NEWZOO,
2017 GLOBAL
ESPORTS
MARKET
REPORT
(2017),
https://newzoo.com/solutions/standard/market-forecasts/global-esports-market-report/.
55. Leo Howell, League of Legends Hosts 14.7 Million Concurrent Viewers During
Worlds, ESPN (Dec. 6, 2016), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/18221739/2016-leaguelegends-world-championship-numbers.
56. Daniel Holloway, TV Ratings: NBA Finals is Most Watched Since 1998, VARIETY
(June 13, 2017, 9:21 AM), http://variety.com/2017/tv/news/tv-ratings-nba-finals-i1202464230/.
57. Joss Wood, New Research: Esports FansMay Not Be Exactly Who You Think They
Are, THE LINES (June 20, 2016), https://www.thelines.com/esports-fan-demographic-research/.
Esports fans are also in a desirable age bracket for marketers with 35% being between the ages
of twenty-five and thirty-four, and 61% being classified as millennials. Zorine Te, The Average
Age of the Esports Fan is 31, According to Latest Nielson Report, YAHOO FINANCE (May 10,
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Collegiate esports, however, has yet to generate similar levels of
consumer interest as their professional counterparts. Professional esports
tournaments currently have the largest prize pools and involve all of the
popular esports teams that attract loyal followers, generating impressive
viewer numbers.51 Still, many industry leaders believe that collegiate esports
has the potential to be a significant revenue generator for schools. 59 In
response to this perceived potential, more than fifty schools now field varsity
esports teams. 60

C.

Types of CollegiateEsports Programs

A survey of collegiate esports tournaments revealed that collegiate
esports teams can be classified into one of the following three categories: (a)
teams representing varsity programs, (b) club teams, or (c) privately formed
recreational teams. 61 Varsity programs recruit players to the school, and it is
this distinction that courts typically use to distinguish varsity teams from
private recreational pursuits. 62 For all practical purposes, varsity esports
programs can further be distinguished from recreational teams in how varsity
programs provide players with scholarships, hire coaches and assign
administrators for them, and officially sponsor the teams for competition in
esports tournaments. 63 Contrast this with esports teams consisting of
recreational club teams and other private esports teams that represent schools
in esports tournaments but do so likely without any formal sponsorship from
the schools. Club teams are recognized by schools, but they are student-run
recreational clubs that generally receive little in the way of financial support

2017),
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/average-age-esports-fan-3 1-according-latest-nielsenreport-002654718.html.
58. Interview by Thomas A. Baker with Michael Brooks, Exec. Dir., NACE (July 17,
2017) [hereinafter Brooks Interview].
59. For a general discussion on collegiate esports' potential, see Darcy, supra note 1.
60. Sean Morrison, List of Varsity Esports ProgramsSpans North America, ESPN (Mar.
15,
2018),
http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/21152905/college-esports-list-varsityesports-programs-north-america. Given the rate of program expansion, it's probable that the
number of programs has increased in the period of time following the publication of this Article.
61. The survey was conducted by the authors and consisted of a review of teams that
competed in collegiate esports tournaments for Collegiate Starleague and TESPA during the
2016-2017 collegiate esports season along with a review of the NACE membership roster.
62. Thomas A. Baker III, Recreational Sports Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK FOR
AMERICAN SPORTS LAW 411, 415 (Michael A. McCann ed., 2018). For cases making this
distinction, see Ochoa v. Cal. State Univ., 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (Ct. App. 1999); Kyriazis v.
Univ. of W. Va., 450 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1994).
63. Brooks Interview, supra note 58.
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from the college or university that they represent.64 In addition to club teams,
there are also privately formed teams of students that claim association with
their schools but are not officially recognized by the school and receive no
funding from the school. 65 Despite the rapid growth of varsity esports
programs, clubs and other recreational teams still make up the majority of
teams competing in collegiate esports tournaments that do not limit
competition to varsity teams. 66
An added benefit for schools that field varsity esports programs or official
club teams may be found in the fact that doing so provides the institution with
a means for managing their brand in collegiate esports tournaments. By
sponsoring official teams, schools put their stamp on participants by branding
them within esports competitions. That act limits unauthorized use of school
brand names/images by unsponsored students on unofficial teams. In the
absence of officially recognized club or varsity teams, students are left to form
their own teams to participate in collegiate esports tournaments. It is not
uncommon for multiple teams to compete under the same school's brand
without the school's authorization. 67 Accordingly, a degree of vulnerability
exists for universities and colleges that are represented by unofficial collegiate
esports teams because the brand image for those schools could be impaired by
teams that engage in prohibited conduct (e.g., cheating or offensive behavior)
while competing in collegiate esports tournaments. The provision of official
club teams allows for some-even if minimal-degree of control for schools
that are in a position to sanction players or teams that do not represent the
school in a positive light. Colleges and universities with varsity programs
enjoy much more authority over esports teams because they have paid coaches
and directors who not only select team players but also establish and enforce
68
program standards.

In terms of control, the positioning of varsity esports programs within
colleges and universities plays an important role in the management of varsity
teams. For instance, athletic departments currently play home to only 20% of
varsity esports programs. 69 The remainder of collegiate varsity esports
programs are located in departments for student affairs or within academic

64. Deppe Interview, supra note 31.
65. Id. Note that some tournaments are only open to club and varsity college esports teams
(e.g., League of Legends College Championship and Campus Series).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Based on a survey conducted for this study of the fifty varsity members of NACE (on
file with author).
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programs, centers, or institutes. 70 The competitive markets for academic and
athletic departments are very different. The same can be true for how these
two types of departments are regulated, managed, and resourced.7
Differences between academic and athletic departments can also be found in
their respective and prevailing social norms and conventions two factors
that influence management and governance. 72
In addition to diverse program placements, varsity esports programs can
be divided in terms of how their other sports are governed. Twenty-seven of
the more than fifty varsity esports programs are housed within schools that
are NCAA member institutions for all other sports, while twenty-five
programs are at National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA)
member institutions. 73 Both the NCAA and NAIA are governing bodies for
intercollegiate athletics. 74 The NCAA is the larger and more prestigious of the
two,7 5 and all of the prominent research institutions in the United States that
field intercollegiate sports are also members of the NCAA. 76 Conversely, the
NAIA has differentiated itself from the NCAA by targeting smaller colleges
for membership, such as teaching colleges, liberal arts colleges, and
historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs).7 7

70. Based on a survey conducted for this study of the fifty varsity members of NACE (on
file with author). For an example of a varsity esports program housed within an academic
institute, see Georgia State's program, which is housed in the Creative Media Industries
Institute, an academic center created from a $22 million gift to generate research on creative
media and share knowledge learned with students and industries. Georgia State believes that its
program could help student-esports players transition from competition to careers in animation
or other media industries. See Stefanie Fogel, Daily Glixel: Pewdiepie has a Change of Heart;
'We Happy Few' Gets a Full Retail Release, ROLLING STONE (Aug. 16, 2017).
71. See Vern Baxter & Charles Lambert, The National Collegiate Athletic Association
and the Governance offHigher Education, 31 Soc. Q. 403, 404 (1990).
72. Id. at 403-04. See generally Galen Trail & Pakianathan Chelladurai, Perceptionsof
IntercollegiateAthletic Goals and Processes: The Influence of Personal Values, 16 J. SPORT
MGMT. 289 (2002) (providing statistical analysis on impact of personal values on perceptions
of athletic department goals).
73. Based on a study of fifty varsity members of NACE conducted by the author (on file
with author).
74. Based on a study of fifty varsity members of NACE conducted by the author (on file
with author). The remainder of the teams not within the NCAA or NAIA are members to other
collegiate organizations (e.g., the National Junior College Athletic Association).
75. Dylan P. Williams et al., The Influence of a University's Social Identity on NCAA
DivisionalAffiliation, 8 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 153, 157 (Dec. 2015).
76. See generally Directory, NCAA, https://web3.ncaa.org/directory/memberList
?type= 1 (last visited Aug. 25, 2018) (providing a list of NCAA member institutions). The NCAA
currently
has
more
than
1,200 member
institutions.
Membership, NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/who-we-are/membership (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
77. Marvin Washington, FieldApproaches to InstitutionalChange: The Evolution ofthe
National CollegiateAthletic Association 1906-1995,25 ORG. STUD. 393, 400 (Mar. 2004). The
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III. REGULATION OF COLLEGIATE ESPORTS

To date, no dominant regulatory agency exists within collegiate esports
that sets the rules for all competitions and regulates athletic programs and
student-athletes in the same manner that the NCAA and NAIA regulate
intercollegiate athletics for their combined 1,281 member institutions.7 1
Instead, the regulation of collegiate esports has mostly been left to tournament
and league producers of collegiate esports competitions (e.g., Collegiate
Starleague (CSL) 79 and TESPA).so There is, however, an emerging and
member-driven regulatory agency in NAC esports (NACE) that is working on
"developing the structure and tools needed to advance collegiate esports in the
varsity space."s'
Like the NCAA, NACE has developed both a constitution and a set of
bylaws that are represented in its Official Policy Handbook. They govern its
member institutions and their student-athletes. 82 Our comparison of NACE's
Official Policy Handbook with the NCAA's Division I Manual revealed some
similarities on the subject of eligibility; however, we found stark contrasts
between how the two organizations govern student-athletes. Perhaps the best
summation of the differences between the NCAA and NACE is found in the
fact that NA CE's Official Policy Handbookconsists of only seventeen pages83
whereas the NCAA's Division I Manual, which only governs one division
within the NCAA, includes 428 pages of regulations. 84 Our review of NACE

NAIA currently has 250 member institutions. See About the NAIA,
http://www.naia.org/ViewArticle.dbml?DBOEMID=27900&ATCLID=205323019
visited Aug. 25, 2018).

NAIA,
(last

78. See Angelos Anastasopoulos, The NCAA Partnerswith Consultancy Firm Intersport
to
Research
College Esports,
THE
ESPORTS
OBSERVER
(Dec.
4,
2017),
https://esportsobserver.com/ncaa-intersport-research-college-esports/.
79. CSL began as an intercollegiate Star Craft league for college students and has
expanded
to
include
additional
games.
What
is
CSL?,
CSTARLEAGUE.COM,
https://cstarleague.com/about (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
80. TESPA started out as a collection of esports clubs from colleges around the country
that organized competitions. TESPA and game producer Blizzard are now partners in the
formalization of esports tournaments, with Blizzard contributing $1 million for scholarships to
tournament winners for the 2017-2018 academic year. Stephanie Chan, Tespa and Blizzard

Serve Up $1 Million for College Esports Scholarships, VENTUREBEAT (Aug. 16, 2017, 11:00
AM), https://venturebeat.com/2017/08/16/tespa-and-blizzard-serve-up-1-million-for-collegeesports-scholarships/.
81. About, NACESPORTS.COM, https://nacesports.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
82. NAC ESPORTS, ESPORTS OFFICIAL POLICY HANDBOOK 1 (2016) [hereinafter NAC
ESPORTS
HANDBOOK],
http://nacesports.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/NAC-eSports-

Constitution-Bylaws-9-29-2016-1-1 .pdf.
83. Id.
84.

See generallyNCAA MANUAL, supra note 6.
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regulations revealed that its bylaws are more consistent with how collegiate
esports tournament and league producers regulate competitors within their
competitions than with the ways in which the NCAA regulates studentathletes. NACE's approach makes sense to apply to collegiate esports because
their regulations need to remain substantially similar to the regulations for
CSL, TESPA, or any other college tournament or league operated by a game
maker.
The following sections present the results from an examination of
student-athlete regulations enacted by NACE, CSL, TESPA, AVGL College,
and the League of Legends College Championship (ULoL).1 5 The results are
presented by topic areas that were selected because they provide a consensus
of the most regulated conduct within collegiate esports. The results from that
review were then compared to student-athlete regulations within Division I of
the NCAA the division with the commercial success coveted by those
promoting collegiate esports.
A.

Academic Eligibility

Within collegiate esports, the basic eligibility requirement for any
competitor is that he is a student at the school that the team represents. For
league competition, TESPA players can establish proof of eligibility through

85. College LoL advertises itself as more than just one tournament, claiming to consist
of collegiate LoL players who organize "casual tournaments" and "social parties." However, the
centerpiece and official tournament produced through this network is the League of Legends
College Championship, which is operated by LoL game maker Riot Games. The tournament is
composed of teams that secured places in qualifying matches in five divisions (called leagues)
that were set around the country through the ULoL network. The five leagues are Campus Series
North, Campus Series South, Campus Series East, Campus Series West, Peach Bowl
Championship, and the Big Ten Network. The Peach Bowl Championship is sponsored by the
Peach Bowl, a college football bowl game in Atlanta, Georgia that is played at Mercedes Benz
Stadium. The Big Ten Network is a league composed of club teams that represent Big Ten
institutions. For more on ULoL, see University League of Legends, What is College LoL,
https://ulol.na.leagueoflegends.com/what-is-college-lol (last visited March 19, 2018).
The Peach Belt Conference Championship is controlled by the same conference
organization as the Peach Bowl-a college football bowl game in Atlanta, Georgia that is played
at Mercedes Benz Stadium. See Sean Morrison, Peach Belt Conference Partnerswith Riot
Games, ESPN (Jan. 4, 2018), http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/21959144/peach-beltconference-partners-riot-games. The Big Ten Network is a league composed of club teams that
represent Big Ten institutions. Gabriel Rosenberg, Go to College, Play Video Games. E-Sports
Make
a Play for the Big Ten, NPR
(Feb.
23,
2017,
12:54 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2017/02/23/515853132/go-to-college-playvideo-games-e-sports-make-a-play-for-the-big-ten.
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the provision of a school email account. 86 School email accounts are not valid
representations of student status because faculty, staff, and even former
students at many institutions have college or university email accounts.
TESPA does require "certified proof' of enrollment for finalists but does not
expressly state what qualifies as "certified proof."" For ULoL, players may
be full- or part-time students, but they must be in good academic and
disciplinary standing at their school and at least seventeen years old by
January 15, 2018, in order to qualify for tournament play." In addition, the
player must not be currently serving an official esports suspension from a
Riot-affiliated competition and be able to pass continual behavior checks.8 9
For the CSL, student-athletes must be enrolled full-time at their
institutions, based on their school's standards for full-time status, and must
also be in good standing. 90 Staff for CSL reserve the right to request
participants to provide official transcripts. Failure to provide those transcripts
could result in punishment. 9' NACE has the most restrictive eligibility rules
in collegiate esports because it goes beyond requiring the student to be in good
standing-it also includes admission qualifications for entering freshman
competitors. Specifically, NACE requires a minimum ACT score of 18 or
SAT score of 860 and a minimum high school grade point average of 2.000
or higher on a 4.000 scale. 92 While the 2.000 grade point average (GPA) is
not necessarily daunting, there is an added requirement that students graduate
from high school in the upper half of their class. This rank must be evidenced
on the student's high school transcript or stated on an official letter written by
the school's headmaster or principal. 93 Lastly, unlike the NCAA, most
collegiate esports tournaments and leagues permit graduate student
participation and do not restrict academic eligibility to a set number of years.
NACE, however, limits student-athlete eligibility to five seasons in esports
(ten semesters).

94

86. North
American
Collegiate
Hearthstone
Open:
Rules,
TESPA,
https://compete.tespa.org/tournament/ 1 /rules (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
87. Id.
88. Eligibility Rules,
COLLEGE
LEAGUE
OF
LEGENDS,
https://newsa.akamaihd.net/public/images/articles-na/2017/CLL18/2018CollegeLoLEligibilityRules2.pdf
(last visited Sept. 5, 2018).
89. Id.
90. LOL Rules: Season Guide to CSL Fall 2018-Spring 2019, CSTARLEAGUE.COM,
https://cstarleague.com/lol/rules (last visited Aug. 25, 2018).
9 1. Id.
92. NAC ESPORTS HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at Bylaw art. II, at 9.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 10.
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NCAA Comparison:Academic EligibilityRules

In comparison to what is required from student-athletes wanting to play
collegiate esports, the NCAA's academic eligibility requirements are far more
detailed but not necessarily more difficult to meet. Like NACE in collegiate
esports, the NCAA also requires enrolling student-athletes to have a minimum
grade point average (GPA) and a qualifying score on either the ACT or SAT. 9 5
The difference is that the NCAA has a sliding-scale standard that allows
students with lower GPAs to qualify with higher ACT or SAT scores, or vice
versa. 96 In this regard, the NCAA's standards better accommodate students
who are not good at standardized tests or come from socioeconomic or cultural
backgrounds that put them at a disadvantage when taking standardized tests
such as the ACT and SAT. 97 The NCAA's sliding scale was enacted following
a legal challenge by student-athletes claiming that the minimum SAT/ACT
requirement resulted in disparate impact discrimination in violation of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.98 The NCAA won the legal challenge
because it is a voluntary association that does not have the requisite
controlling authority over its members necessary to subject it to Title VI's
reach. 99 Regardless, the NCAA subsequently modified its rules to be more
accommodating and less discriminatory in the wake of the case's
resolution.' 00 The NCAA allows for a second sliding scale for non-qualifiers
to qualify as academic redshirts-students who may participate in practices
and other training sessions but must sit out the first year of intercollegiate
competition.101

As NACE grows, it should consider adopting a sliding scale similar to the
NCAA's so that its eligibility requirements do not discriminate unnecessarily
against those who could be unfairly impacted by NACE's hardline
standardized test policy. Allowing student-athletes with higher GPAs to
qualify with lower test scores satisfies the goal of setting minimum academic

95. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.02.13, at 159.
96. See id. at Bylaw 14.3.1.1.3, at 165.
97. See id The lowest GPA allowed under the sliding scale is a 2.000, which requires the
student-athlete to earn a 1020 on the SAT or 86 on the ACT. On the other end of the scale, the
minimum test scores are 400 for the SAT and 37 for the ACT, and they require a 3.550 or above
GPA.
98. See Cureton v. NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 108 (3d Cir. 1999).
99. Seeid.at118.
100. See Thomas A. Baker III & Daniel P. Connaughton, Cureton v. NCAA: A Blow-byBlow Account ofthe Landmark Title VI Challenges to the NCAA and Their Recent Implications,
13 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT, July 2003, at 175.
101. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.3.1.2.1, at 165-66.
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qualifications while limiting unfairness to those who, for whatever reason, are
at a disadvantage when taking standardized tests. 102
In addition to the NCAA's sliding scale, NACE and any collegiate esports
league should consider adopting more exacting course requirements so that
enrolling student-athletes are properly prepared for the rigors of higher
education. The NCAA requires enrolling student-athletes to have completed
ten of sixteen required core courses, with seven of those ten courses to be
completed in English, math, and science.' 03 Those requirements, however, do
not apply to international students, who must instead satisfy international
credentials.1 04 The problem that NACE and other league operators that
regulate academic requirements within collegiate esports would face is that
discerning eligibility requires certification for each student-athlete. This
process can be quite complicated. Implementing an initial eligibility
clearinghouse like that of the NCAA, which certifies student-athlete
eligibility, would be complicated and costly. Still, the implementation of
stricter course requirements and a certifying agency within collegiate esports
would better ensure that student-athletes are actual students and qualified for
admission into the schools they represent. o
In terms of making sure that student-athletes remain academically
qualified, the NCAA requires significantly more from its students than what
is required for competition in collegiate esports. Specifically, the NCAA has
sets of rules for determining whether student-athletes are making adequate
progress towards degree requirements. 106 These rules include standards for
hours accepted for degree credit,' 0 7 hours earned toward a minor, 08 and a
requirement that students fulfill a percentage of degree requirements by their
third year.1 09 As collegiate esports grows, regulatory bodies like NACE and
league operators like TESPA and CSL should consider doing more thanjust

102. For more on the discriminatory impact of standardized testing, see William C. Kidder
& Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates 'Built-in-Headwinds':An Educationaland Legal Analysis
ofDisparateImpact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 131, 141-46 (2002).
103. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.3.1.1, at 164.
104. Id.
105. For an examination, including criticism, of the NCAA's academic standards, see
Todd A. Petr & John J. McArdle, Academic Research and Reform: A History of the Empirical
Basisfor NCAA Academic Policy, 5 J. INTERCOLLEGIATE SPORT 27 (2012).
106. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.4, at 170-78. An in-depth
examination of the NCAA's current academic standards goes beyond the scope of this article.
For a chart on the NCAA's standards, see Division I Progress-Toward-DegreeRequirements,
NCAA,
http://www.ncaa.org/about/division-i-progress-toward-degree-requirements
(last
visited Mar. 19, 2018).
107. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.4.3.1.7, at 172.
108. See id. at Bylaw 14.4.3.1.7.2, at 172.
109. See id. at Bylaw 14.4.3.2, at 172.
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requiring that student-athletes remain in "good standing." The good standing
requirement can be easily subverted by schools that care more about gaining
a competitive advantage than fielding a team with students who are all
legitimately concerned with making progress towards a degree.
Schools continually try to subvert the NCAA's standards so that they can
keep talented athletes qualified for competition, even though they struggle to
qualify as students at the institutions they represent. For instance, the
University of North Carolina (UNC) recently evaded NCAA sanction despite
serious allegations of academic fraud related to its funneling of students into
classes that lacked academic rigor."o The NCAA found that it lacked the
power to punish UNC because the classes were made available to athletes and
non-athletes alike."' If collegiate esports lives up to its incredible potential,
then there will be an incentive for schools to circumvent academic standards
in order to keep players eligible. NACE, and any other regulatory body within
collegiate esports, should consider the UNC example when developing policy
for punishing programs for academic fraud.112
Another academic component from the NCAA that collegiate esports may
consider adopting as it grows and matures is a methodology for tracking
graduation rates for collegiate esports programs.11 3 Requiring schools to track
graduation rates and report findings places the NCAA in position to monitor
and assess the academic progress of student-athletes at member-institutions
based on the attainment of degrees. Unfortunately, the current graduation rate
standard is a bit clouded for sports such as men's basketball and football
because many talented underclassmen leave school early to pursue
professional careers and may never complete their degrees.114
It is doubtful that graduation rates for collegiate esports would be as
affected by players leaving early for professional careers because esports
players are much younger than their professional counterparts in traditional

110. See Marc Tracy, N.C.A.A.: North Carolina Will Not Be Punished for Academic
Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/13/sports/unc-northcarolina-ncaa.html.
111. See id.
112. For a scholarly review of NCAA academic fraud cases, see Bradley David Ridpath et
al., NCAA Academic Fraud Cases and Historical Consistency: A Comparative Content
Analysis, 25 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75 (2015).
113. Like academic standards in general, a detailed review of the NCAA's tracking
policies for graduation rates exceeds the scope of this study. For more on graduation rates, see
Tracking Graduation Rates, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/tracking-graduation-rates (last
visited Aug 30, 2018).
114. See E. Woodrow Eckard, NCAA Athlete GraduationRates: Less Than Meets the Eye,
24 J. SPORT MGMT. 45, 54 (2010).
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sports."' Furthermore, training for professional esports requires incredible
amounts of play per day. Full-time students likely do not have the time
between classes and sleep to dedicate enough hours to esports play that would
allow them to transition to the professional level.11 6 If players are good
enough to play professionally, they will likely choose that route instead of
collegiate esports. Conversely, the NBA requires its athletes to be one year
removed from high school to be eligible, while the NFL requires its athletes
to be three years removed from high school to be eligible." 7 Accordingly,
athletes for those sports use the NCAA as a developmental league for
professional sport development. Since players with the ability to compete
professionally in esports may do so without having to wait a set amount of
years after graduating from high school, there is little to no chance that
collegiate esports would be used primarily as a professional training ground
for professional esports. Instead, it is more probable that degree attainment
would be the primary objective for most collegiate esports players who rely
on varsity scholarships to pay for their education."
B.

Transfer Rules

The results of our study revealed that collegiate esports takes a very
simplified and pragmatic approach to regulating student-athlete transfers from
one school to another within collegiate esports. 119 With the exception of
NACE, the tournaments and leagues examined in this study only require that
players stick to one team during a season.' 20 This simple rule prohibits players
from switching schools in the middle of a season or tournament. For these
organizations, students have the same degree of mobility as any other student
at the institution not regulated by the NCAA, even those who are on academic

115. See Average Age in Esports vs. Major Sports, ESPN (Sept. 19, 2017),
http://www.espn.com/esports/story/_/id/20733853/the-average-age-esports-versus-nfl-nbamlb-nhl.
116. See Hollist, supra note 39, at 833 (detailing how professional esports players regularly
play up to nineteen hours per day); John T. Holden et al., Esports: Children, Stimulants and
Video-Gaming Induced Inactivity, 54 J. PAEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 830, 830 (2018).
117. For more on the NBA and NFL's eligibility rules, see Michael A. McCann & Joseph
S. Rosen, Legality ofAge Restrictions in the NBA and the NFL, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 731,
732-33 (2005).
118. Deppe Interview, supra note 31.
119. Based on a survey of student-athlete regulations for collegiate esports leagues and
tournaments (on file with author).
120. Based on a survey of student-athlete regulations for collegiate esports leagues and
tournaments (on file with author).
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scholarship. 121 Yet, the simple rule of limiting players to one team per season
ensures a degree of team stability for league play.
NACE takes a similar, but slightly more exacting, approach. Players are
free to transfer, but must complete a "permission to contact" form that is
signed by the esports coach/director and submitted to the NACE ESPORTS
national office prior to contacting another NACE member institution.1 22
Following this submission, the student-athlete must then obtain the "Official
NAC ESPORTS Transfer Player Eligibility Statement" from NACE and
present that statement to both the exiting and incoming institution.1 23 NACE
also places more emphasis than its peers in collegiate esports in regulating
"terms of attendance."1 24

Emphasizing terms of attendance within its transfer policies makes sense
given that NACE places limits on the number of competitive seasons in which
student-athletes are permitted to participate. NACE allows students to
withdraw within twenty-one calendar days following the official opening date
of classes before a term of attendance is credited to the transferring student.1 25
NACE also places restrictions on transferring students who were suspended
by their initial institution 26 prior to their transfer, requiring them to sit out
two full semesters 27 before being eligible for competition. 128 Students who
are suspended for misconduct committed during esports competition must
serve whatever punishment is imposed on them before they are eligible to
compete at their new institution.1 29 There is one odd rule within NACE's
transfer regulations: a student charged with a season of competition in one
esports by a different institution in the same academic year shall be charged
with two seasons of competition when that student transfers to another
institution within that academic year. 3 0 Thus, a student could be charged for
two years of competitive eligibility within one academic year.' 3 ' The reasons
for this rule remain unclear. Unlike most other collegiate esports regulators,
NACE's transfer policies also include academic restrictions to ensure that

121. Based on a survey of student-athlete regulations for collegiate esports leagues and
tournaments (on file with author).
122. NAC ESPORTS HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at Rule E8, at 12.
123. Id. at Rule El, at 11.
124. Id. at Rule E2-7, at 11-12 (showing that NAC eSports places emphasis in regulating
terms of attendance).
125. Id. at Rule E3, at 11.
126. The suspension could be for any reason (academic or other).
127. Or three full quarters for schools on a quarter system.
128. NAC ESPORTS HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at Rule E5, at 11.
129. Id. at Rule E6, at 12.
130. Id at Rule E7, at 12.
131. Id
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132

NCAA Comparisons:Transfers

Thus far, there have been several suggestions for improving collegiate
esports in this article that were based on the way the NCAA regulates its
member institutions and student-athletes. When it comes to regulating
transfers, however, the NCAA might want to change its policies to mirror
what is done within collegiate esports. In fact, the NCAA is currently
exploring ways to modify its transfer rules, the legality of which is at issue in
pending actions brought against the NCAA.1 3 3 Before addressing possible
changes, some discussion on the current regulations within the NCAA's
Division I is needed.
The NCAA permits a one-time transfer, without penalty, for all sports
except men's football, basketball, and hockey. 3 4 For those three sports,
however, the student-athlete must sit out one season of competition before he
is eligible to represent the new school in intercollegiate competition. 15 The
NCAA defends an exception for those three sports on the grounds that athletes
within them have historically underachieved in the classroom. 136 Yet, that
justification is mooted by a transfer certification process that requires studentathletes who wish to transfer from one Division I program to first certify their

132. See id. at Rule F 1-3, at 11. The NAC esports handbook also provides guidance for
students transferring from junior colleges and allows for a military service exception to its "term
of attendance policy." See id. at Rule G, Rule H1-3, at 12, 13.
133. See Steve Berkowitz, Judge Sides with NCAA in Lawsuit Challenging D-I Football
Transfer Rules, USA TODAY (Mar. 7, 2017, 7:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/2017/03/07/judge-sides-with-ncaa-lawsuit-challenging-transfer-rules-division-ischools/98877526/ (noting the dismissal of one of two cases that challenge the NCAA's transfer
policies).
134. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.5.5.2.10, at 185. The NCAA also allows
student-athletes who have graduated from their original institution to transfer without having to
sit for a year, and this policy extends to all sports. Id. at Bylaw 14.6, at 187. Conversely, NACE
does not allow for a graduate student transfer once the student graduates then eligibility is
exhausted. NAC ESPORTS HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at Bylaw C3, at 10.
135. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 14.5.5.2.10(a), at 185. There are exceptions
to the rule that permit immediate play when the original school discontinues the student-athlete's
sport, the original school is reclassified into a different NCAA division, or the original school
never sponsored the student-athlete's sport of choice. Id. at Bylaw 14.5.5.2.6, at 184.
136. Matthew R. Cali, The NCAA's Transfer of Power: An Analysis of the Future
Implications the Proposed NCAA Transfer Rules Will Have on the Landscape of College
Sports, 21 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 217, 226 (2014) (citing Get the Facts About
Transfers, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/news/get-facts-abouttransfers (last updated May 30, 2012)).
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academic eligibility prior to contacting other institutions. 17 The NCAA's
certification process is similar to NACE's "permission to contact process,"
but the NCAA's certification process adds a level of academic rigor. If
student-athletes for men's basketball, football, and hockey must be
academically eligible to transfer, then why must they sit out of competition
for one season? The NCAA asserts that the rule helps transferring studentathletes acclimate to their new academic environments,' 3 8 but skeptics and
critics have good reason for believing that this assertion is pretext for
protecting teams (and coaches) rather than students.
The NCAA, however, has even less reasonable rationale for a different
rule that requires student-athletes to receive permission from their original
school before they are allowed to transfer. 3 9 This rule is controversial because
if the original school does not provide the student-athlete with permission to
transfer, then the student-athlete must go one full year without an athletic
scholarship at their new school.1 40 Such a policy is financially crippling for
student-athletes who desire to transfer from one school in a division to another
in that same division, particularly for students from lower socioeconomic
backgrounds. In practice, original schools tend to restrict player movement to
specific competitor institutions. 141 Furthermore, student-athletes who transfer
to schools without permission from their original institution also forfeit a year
of athletic eligibility. 142 The forfeiture of eligibility and lack of access to
scholarship money serve no academic purpose; they are harsh penalties that
were obviously designed by the NCAA to discourage transfers. Fortunately,

137. See
2017-18
Guide
for
Four-Year
Transfers,
NCAA,
https://web.archive.org/web/20180729103957/http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/201718_TransferGuide_4_Year_20170721.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) [hereinafter NCAA
Transfer Guide]; NCAA Manual, supra note 6, at Bylaws 14.4.3.1.2, 14.5.2, and 14.5.4.6.3, at
170, 178-79, 181 (for more information on what is required for certifying transfer students).
138. McHale v. Cornell Univ., 620 F. Supp. 67, 68, 68 n.4 (N.D.N.Y. 1985). For further
discussion of the NCAA's rationale, see Sarah M. Konsky, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA
Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1587 (2003).
139. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 13.1.1.3, at 97. For an exception that does
not require permission from original institutions that are put on probation by the NCAA, see id.,
at Bylaw 13.1.1.3.5, at 98.
140. Id. at Bylaw 13.1.1.3, at 97.
141. See Andy Staples, The NCAA Finally Seems Open to Some Common Sense. Here's
What it Should do About Transfers, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (July 3, 2017),
https://www.si.com/college-football/2017/07/03/ncaa-rules-change-transfers. For information
on a proposal to strip coaches of the power to limit where student-athletes transfer, see George
Schroeder, NCAA Proposal Would Stop Schools, Coaches From Holding Transfers Hostage,
USA TODAY (June 28, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/
college/2017/06/28/ncaa-proposal-ease-path-for-transfers/437306001/.
142. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 13.1.1.3, at 97.
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the NCAA announced that it would end the permission requirement starting
October 15, 2018,143 but more reform is needed.
The NCAA should, instead, do what it purports to do putting the wellbeing of student-athletes first and allowing them reasonable freedom to select
their schools. Currently, the NCAA's policies more closely resemble rules
restricting player movement within professional sport leagues than academic
policies designed to protect student academic development. The NCAA is
considering several proposals for modifying its transfer policies,' 44 and the
NCAA should turn to collegiate esports for guidance. Every NCAA member
institution has its own transfer policies for incoming students1 45 that are set
by the institutions, and collegiate esports programs currently defer to those
school policies rather than setting up independent and separate rules that
apparently protect teams at the expense of students. The NCAA can protect
teams and the integrity of competitions by borrowing the rule that limits
students to one team per season as per the collegiate esports regulations. That
rule, combined with the NCAA's certification policy and the new school's
requirements that limit the transfer of credit hours, should be enough to
preserve the academic integrity of NCAA competitions for all sports,
including men's basketball, football, and hockey.
C. Amateurism
For this section, it's necessary to examine the NCAA's amateurism model
before addressing the role that amateurism plays within collegiate esports. The
reason for starting with the NCAA is that it has created an amateurism model
for intercollegiate athletics. The NCAA is currently evaluating whether it
could implement that model within collegiate esports.1 46 The NCAA
combines its athletics eligibility rules with its amateurism rules, which makes

143. Scott Gleeson, NCAA Lightens TransferRules for College Athletes, Changes Redshirt
Guidelines, USA TODAY (June 13, 2018, 1:09 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
sports/college/2018/06/13/ncaa-lightens-transfer-rules-assist-student-athletes/698386002/.
144. See NCAA Considers Changes to Allow Immediate Eligibility to Some Transfers,
USA TODAY (Feb. 13, 2018, 3:32 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/
2018/02/13/ncaa-considers-tying-transfer-eligibility-to-academic-marks/ 110380578/.
145. For tips on navigating an institution's transfer rules and policies, see Travis Mitchell,
10 Things ProspectiveCollege TransferStudents Need to Know, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS
(Aug. 21, 2015, 9:00 AM), https://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/slideshows/10things-prospective-college-transfer-students-need-to-know.
146. See Sharon Coone, NCAA's Peach Belt Announces Partnershipwith College League
of Legends Here's What That Means, Plus the Pros and Cons, BLITZ (Jan. 4, 2018),
https://blitzesports.com/lol/article/2998/ncaas-peach-belt-announces-first-conferencepartnership-col.
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sense given that many of the NCAA's athlete eligibility requirements require
amateur status in order for student-athletes to be eligible for NCAA
competitions. 147 In fact, the NCAA's first eligibility requirement for its
student-athletes mandates that only amateurs are eligible to participate in
NCAA-sanctioned sports.1 48 Further, a student-athlete's amateur status may
be lost as a result of activities that transpired prior to their enrollment in
college (i.e. their receipt of impermissible compensation). 149 Regarding
compensation, the NCAA limits what student-athletes may earn through their
sport participation to room and board, tuition, fees, necessary course books, 5 0
and small stipends that cover other costs that are anticipated as part of
attending the athlete's school of choice.' 5 ' In addition, the NCAA prohibits
student-athletes from profiting off of the use of their names, images, and
likenesses for commercial purposes1 52
There are, however, some exceptions to the NCAA's amateurism
eligibility rule. The first is found in Article 12.02.7, which permits studentathletes who have received money for expenses incurred as part of their
participation in outside competitions, as long as those expenses are from a
permissible source (meaning the event sponsor or a club team) and the
compensation does not exceed necessary expenses by $300. 153Another
exception allows student-athletes that have competed on a tennis, golf, twoperson beach volleyball or two-person synchronized diving team with persons
who were competing for cash or prizes so long as the student-athlete did not
receive payment or prize money that exceeds his or her actual and necessary
expenses, which may only be provided by the sponsor of the event.1 54 Lastly,

147. By positioning its amateurism rules as conditions for eligibility, the NCAA has
managed to successfully convince some federal circuit courts that its rules restricting athlete
compensation are not commercial, and therefore, not subject to the Sherman Antitrust Act. See
Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 185-86 (3d Cir. 1998).
148. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 12.01.1, at 61.
149. Id. at Bylaw 12.01.3, at 61. The NCAA enumerates the type of conduct that would
render ineligible a student-athlete based on a loss of amateur status as including: student-athlete
compensation in any form for that sport; acceptance of a promise for future payment for
performance in that sport following completion of NCAA eligibility; signing a contract to play
professional sports; compensation or financial assistance provided by a sports organization
based on athletic skill; competitive play for a professional team; entering a professional league
draft; or entering an agreement with a sports agent. Id. at Bylaw 12.1.2, at 63-64.
150. Scholarships, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/student-athletes/future/scholarships (last
visited Aug. 27, 2018).
151. Cost ofAttendance Q&A, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.com/news/ncaa/article/2015-0903/cost-attendance-qa (last visited Aug. 27, 2018).
152. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 6, at Bylaw 12.5.2.1, at 75.
153. Id. at Bylaw 12.02.7, at 62.
154. Id. at Bylaw 12.2.3.2, at 69.
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student-athletes who competed for Olympic or national teams are permitted
to do so and receive money for actual and necessary expenses.I As a result,
the NCAA's amateurism rules force athletes, most of whom are young adults,
to make the difficult decision of selecting to retain amateur eligibility status
so that they can pursue their education or earn money through sport.15 6 For
example, if a collegiate gymnast competed as a professional or was
compensated for having her image on a box of cereal, she would not be
eligible to compete as a collegiate gymnast. ' 7 The NCAA's amateurism rules
have imposed an unreasonable restraint on the market for student-athlete
services for decades. The rules have also been at the center of numerous legal
actions brought by student-athletes, most of which involved complaints
grounded in antitrust law.' In fact, one such action is pending now within
the Ninth Circuit in In re National Collegiate Athletic Association Athletic
Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litigation.19 So this begs the question: Why is
the NCAA anchored to its amateurism model?
The concept of amateurism was first introduced into intercollegiate
athletics as a control measure to reduce the number of fatalities in college
football.1 60 Amateurism no longer serves the purpose of ensuring studentathlete safety but persists within all NCAA-sanctioned athletics for another
purported purpose: to preserve consumer interest in intercollegiate

155. Id. at Bylaw 12.2.3.2.5, at 69.
156. See For Elite Gymnasts, GoingPro is a Complicated Choice, USA TODAY (July 20,
2016,
12:33 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/olympics/2016/07/20/for-elitegymnasts-going-pro-is-a-complicated-choice/87340808/.
157. Id.
158. See Thomas A. Baker III et al., White v. NCAA: A Chink in the Antitrust Armor, 21
J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 75, 88-91 (2011).
159. 311 F.R.D. 532 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
160. The involvement of professionals was partly blamed for a high number of deaths that
occurred during the first decades of intercollegiate football. Dennis A. Johnson & John
Acquaviva, Point/Counterpoint: Paying College Athletes, SPORT J. (June 15, 2012),
http://thesportjournal.org/article/pointcounterpoint-paying-college-athletes/.
The universities
that fielded college football teams at the time came together, under the urging of then U.S.
President Theodore Roosevelt, to form a regulatory body that would ultimately become the
NCAA. Id. As one of its first measures, the NCAA enacted regulations to remove
professionalism from college football by requiring that all participants be amateurs, meaning
that they were not allowed to receive compensation from the schools they represented. Baker et
al., supra note 158, at 78. It wasn't until 1956 that the NCAA modified its amateurism
restrictions to permit members to provide athletes with scholarships that included tuition, fees,
room and board, and course-related books (grant-in-aid). For more on the history of amateurism
within intercollegiate athletics, see Daniel E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century:
Defender ofAmateurism or Antitrust Recidivist, 86 OR. L. REv. 329 (2007).

Published by Scholar Commons,

25

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 70, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
80

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 70: 55

athletics.' 6 ' The Third,' 62 Fifth,1 63 Sixth,1 64 Seventh,1 65 and Ninth Circuits1 66

have each relied upon the purported procompetitive purpose for amateurism
to justify constraints on trade imposed by the amateurism model, which
ultimately limits student-athlete compensation and prohibits them from
profiting off of their public status.1 67 The procompetitive justification for the
NCAA's amateurism model stems from Justice Stevens' seminal dicta in
NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.168 In Board of
Regents, Justice Stevens relied on the academic tradition inherent to the
NCAA's products as a basis for the creation of sports products that were
distinct from their professional counterparts.1 69 Since the academic tradition
facilitated product creation, it provided the NCAA and its member institutions
with a joint venture defense to the application of the per se rule. Justice
Stevens believed that amateurism was integral to the academic tradition; thus,
it was also essential to product creation and the preservation of consumer
interest in intercollegiate athletics. 170
Yet there is no market-based evidence that supports the presumption that
preservation of amateurism is necessary in order to maintain consumer
interest in intercollegiate athletics. 171 In fact, at least one study has disproved
this presumption by measuring consumer interest in college football following
changes to NCAA rules that allowed schools to provide cash payments to
student-athletes that do not exceed the cost of attendance. 172 Nevertheless,
neither the interest in protecting college football players nor the purported
preservation of amateurism provide a basis for implementing the NCAA's
amateurism model into collegiate esports.

161. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984) (noting the
procompetitive presumption of consumer interest in amateurism stems from Justice Stevens's
seminal dicta in Board of Regents).
162. See Smith v. NCAA, 139 F.3d 180, 187 (3d Cir. 1998).
163. See McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988).
164. See Bassett v. NCAA, 528 F.3d 426, 430-33 (6th Cir. 2008).
165. See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 344-45 (7th Cir. 2012); Banks v. NCAA, 977
F.2d 1081, 1088 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Board ofRegents, 468 U.S. at 104).
166. See O'Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2015).
167. Thomas A. Baker III et al., Debunking the NCAA's Myth that Amateurism Conforms
with Antitrust Law: A Legal and Statistical Analysis, 85 TENN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3072641.
168. 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Baker & Brison, supra note 19, at 360.
172. Id.
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CollegiateEsports and Amateurism

Currently, the NCAA's amateurism model is neither incorporated nor
enforced by any of the collegiate esports tournaments we examined for this
study or by the following leagues: TESPA, CSL, AVGL College, or ULoL.1 73
Students who compete in any of the major esports tournaments and within
those five leagues may have been professionals in the past and are permitted
to profit off of their names, images, and likenesses (NILs). AVGL College
does have a rule that restricts participation in its tournaments for players who
have been professional recently,1 74 but this rule is not a blanket prohibition
for anyone who has ever profited off of gaming. Furthermore, the rule serves
a competitive purpose of preventing college players from having to compete
against current or recent professionals who dedicate far more than forty hours
per week to esports training and competition. 75 After the passage of a
reasonable amount of time, the rule permits former professionals to compete
in AVGL College tournaments.1 76
Unlike the major college esports tournaments and leagues, NACE values
the amateur status of esports participants, and therefore, has tighter
compensation restrictions for its students, limiting them to tuition, fees,
supplies needed for classes, and room and board.' 7 7 However, there is an
exception that allows schools to provide for medical and dental expenses.17
Additionally, NACE's eligibility rules place restrictions on student eligibility
by requiring that they be eligible according to the institution's standards for
intercollegiate competition 79 and subjecting them to eligibility standards set
by affiliated conferences that are stricter than what NACE requires for
eligibility."so NACE's compensation restrictions are almost identical to the
NCAA's grant-in-aid restrictions before compensation was extended to
include amounts up to the cost of attendance. Currently, collegiate esports is
not a multi-billion-dollar industry, but if economic growth projections for

173. This finding is based on our review of the relevant rules for collegiate esports
tournaments and the leagues examined as part of this study.
174. AVGL
Rules: Registration Requirements, para. 3, AVGL COLLEGE,
https://avglcollege.org/rules (last visited Sept. 5, 2018) [hereinafter A VGL Rules].
175. However, this rule seems unnecessary due to the fact that rules requiring full-time
student status should prevent professionals from entering into tournaments as "ringers."
176. See AVGL Rules, supra note 174.
177. NAC ESPORTS HANDBOOK, supra note 82, at Bylaw art. III, at 13.
178. Id. at Bylaw art. IV, at 14.
179. Id. at Bylaw art. II, at 10.
180. Id. In 2018, the Peach Belt, a Division II athletic conference within the NCAA,
became the first NCAA athletic conference to develop a partnership with a college esports
league-ULoL. Coone, supra note 146.
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'

collegiate esports prove true, then NACE and its member institutions could
eventually find themselves in legal battles similar to those which the NCAA
must defend.' 8
For collegiate esports, however, there is no procompetitive justification
for an amateurism model that is similar or identical to that which the NCAA
inflicts on its student-athletes. The basis for the procompetitive justification
depends on Justice Stevens' presumption that protection of consumer interest
in intercollegiate sports turns on the preservation of the NCAA's amateurism
model.' 8 2 Without amateurism, the justification posits that the NCAA's
products would transform into minor league sports that consumers do not
value.
The validity of this justification is dubious in application to the NCAA's
products but has no basis for extension to collegiate esports because
consumers have never valued the amateurism model as part of their motives
for consumption. Collegiate esports widens consumer choice already by
providing a college version of esports. This happens even without strict
amateurism provisions. In fact, a strong argument could be made that the
existence of consumer interest in collegiate esports undermines the
procompetitive justification for the NCAA's amateurism rules. If consumers
find value in a collegiate product extension of a professional
sport/entertainment product that does not incorporate strict compensation
limits and restrict athletes from profiting off of their publicity, then perhaps
those limits and restrictions are not what attract consumers to the NCAA's
products. In other words, the growing success of collegiate esports provides
even more evidence that the NCAA's version of "amateurism" is not integral
to the creation of intercollegiate sport products and should instead be found to
be in violation of antitrust law. Legal decisions that have insulated the
NCAA's amateurism model from antitrust law have facilitated the
manipulation of the market for student-athlete services. 83

181. See, e.g., In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap. Antitrust Litig., 311 F.R.D. 532
(N.D. Cal. 2014) (a Ninth Circuit case that challenges the NCAA's amateurism rules based on
antitrust law).
182. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 120 (1984).
183. Baker & Brison, supra note 19, at 345 (stating that the competition for student-athlete
services has intensified, as has the spending on NCAA sports. However, the NCAA's
amateurism restrictions impose an inorganic limit on the financial competition for studentathletes. The arms race for student-athletes has resulted in spending on lavish facilities and
coaches salaries to the detriment of student-athletes).
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Additionally, the culture surrounding collegiate esports would make it
difficult, if not impossible, to implement the NCAA's amateurism model.18 4
Specifically, the cash prizes for esports would render ineligible for collegiate
play those who have already participated in weekend esports tournaments.'"I
Furthermore, esports consumers value being able to stream gameplay from
their favorite players regardless of whether those players are professionals.
Esports consumers likely would not acquiesce to the enactment of policies
that would prevent them from gaining access to their favorite players merely
because the NCAA would prefer that student-athletes not profit from
streaming their gameplay on services like Twitch.18 6
The potential for exploitation of student-athletes by the imposition of
amateurism rules could be greater within collegiate esports than other
commercially-successful intercollegiate sports (men's basketball and
football) because the sports students play are also commercial products that
are owned by game producers.'" If collegiate esports grows into a
commercially successful industry, then both the schools and the game
producers will profit from that success. However, this success will come at
the expense of the student-athletes who are limited to less than what their
peers in men's basketball and football receive through cost-of-attendance
stipends.
Additionally, allowances for students-such as the opportunity to profit
off of their publicity and the opportunity to participate despite past
professional status-are undermined by NACE rules that incorporate by
reference any stricter policies set by individual schools or conference policies
that go beyond what NACE requires. If schools or conferences want to enact
stricter rules, then that is their prerogative. NACE, however, should have no
role in enforcing amateurism restrictions imposed by its member institutions
or athletic conferences to which their members belong. In fact, by referring to
rules enacted by its members and third-party athletic conferences, NACE
voluntarily exposes itself to potential challenges concerning the legality of
rules that NACE had no part in creating. NACE needs to revisit all of its
amateurism rules and strongly consider removing them. In its place, NACE

184. Bryce Blum, The NCAA and Esports Don't Mix But Soon, They Might Have To,
ESPN (Oct. 23, 2017), http://www.espn.com/college-sports/story/_/id/21121852/the-ncaaesports-mix-soon-to.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See John T. Holden et al., The Future Is Now: Esports Policy Considerations and
PotentialLitigation, 27 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 46, 59 (2017); John T. Holden et al., Esports
Corruption:Gambling, Doping, and Global Governance, 32 MD. J. INT'L L. 236,242-43 (2017)
(discussing issues arising with esports gambling that may not arise in traditional sports).
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should develop policies more in line with leading collegiate esports leagues
and tournaments and allow schools to dictate what they are willing to invest
in students and let the market determine student value.
IV. CONCLUSION

The NCAA could bring many valuable contributions to collegiate esports,
whether it took a dominant regulatory role in collegiate esports or through the
borrowing of NCAA regulations by NACE. For instance, the NCAA's
academic standards are currently far more rigorous than any found within
collegiate esports. Yet, collegiate esports should not embrace the NCAA's
amateurism model or its current rules that restrict student-athlete transfers.
Instead, the NCAA should look to collegiate esports in revising its transfer
rules and as providing proof that amateurism isn't an essential element for
growing a commercially successful intercollegiate sport product. In the
coming months the NCAA must decide whether or not it will attempt to adopt
a regulatory role within collegiate esports.
At the same time, collegiate esports must decide whether it wants to
involve the NCAA or implement NCAA-like regulation. At this point,
collegiate esports is better off going it alone. The findings from this study
suggest that the tournaments and leagues that make up collegiate esports
would not benefit from the NCAA's rules, particularly its amateurism model.
Thus, instead of being viewed as a savior, the NCAA should be thought of as
a noob" to esports that will bog down play with its amateurism rules if
allowed to join the party.1 89

188. A noob
is
an
unskilled player
in
LoL. NOOB,
DICTIONARY.COM,
https://www.dictionary.com/browse/noob (last visited March 20, 2018).
189. A party is team of players in LoL. See League of Legends Terminology, FANDOM:
LEAGUE
OF
LEGENDS
WIKI,
http://leagueoflegends.wikia.com/wiki/Leagueof
Legends terminology (last visited Mar. 20, 2018).
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